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KEYNOTE TRANSCRIPT
“AMERICA THE VIRTUAL: SECURITY,
PRIVACY, AND INTEROPERABILITY IN AN
INTERCONNECTED WORLD”
LEAP-AHEAD PRIVACY AS A GOVERNMENT
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
IVAN K. FONG* & DAVID G. DELANEY**
Thank you for your invitation to speak at today’s symposium, whose
theme, “America the Virtual: Security, Privacy, and Interoperability in an
Interconnected World,” is without a doubt both timely and important. The
issues you are discussing and debating here are central, not only to
industry, government, and the academic community in general, but also to
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS” or “Department”) in
particular. One of the Department’s five core missions, after all, is to
safeguard and secure cyberspace. And it is no exaggeration to say that
“[o]ur daily life, economic vitality, and national security depend on a safe,
secure, and resilient cyberspace.”1
It is also no exaggeration to state that our nation faces significant and

* Although Mr. Fong delivered these remarks after his departure from his position as
General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in October 2012, they were
prepared by Mr. Fong in his official capacity during his tenure with DHS and thus represent
views consistent with those of the Administration.
** Deputy Associate General Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The
authors wish to thank Bruce McConnell, Matthew Angelo, and Lynn Parker for their
substantial assistance with these remarks.
1. Understanding the Homeland Threat Landscape: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 16 (2012) (testimony of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec.), available at http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland
.house.gov/files/Testimony-Napolitano_0.pdf.
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increasing cyberthreats from a range of individual, organized, and state
actors. Recent headlines remind us, for example, that malicious actors can
easily render tens of thousands of computers inoperable, as was done to
Saudi Aramco in August of this year; that distributed denial of service
attacks can significantly degrade web services, as was done to several
major U.S. banks last month; and that hackers can penetrate the networks
of companies operating natural-gas pipelines.
The statistics on cybercrime, data breaches, and loss of personal
information are sobering. This year the global cost of cybercrime has been
estimated at $110 billion.2 Between ninety-five and ninety-eight percent of
records lost through data breaches contain personal information—that is,
data such as names, addresses, e-mails, or social security numbers.3 In
fiscal year 2011, the Secret Service prevented $1.6 billion in potential
losses through its cybercrime investigations. And just last year, the United
States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, which is DHS’s 24-hour
cyber-watch and warning center, responded to more than 106,000 incident
reports and released more than 5000 actionable cybersecurity alerts and
information products to our public and private sector partners. In short, the
threats to our cybersecurity are real, they are serious, and they are urgent.
The good news is that over the past four years DHS has taken significant
steps to vastly improve the security of federal government information
systems, enhance cybersecurity for the private sector and non-federal
government entities, and promote cybersecurity nationwide, while at the
same time recognizing the unique privacy concerns that exist within the
cyber sphere. DHS continues to seek improvements in the ways that
government is postured to address these issues, most notably through this
Administration’s cybersecurity legislative proposal. Although that effort
failed in the Senate last August, the federal government will continue to
identify the ways that the nation—through its laws, values, and
institutions—can improve our cyber awareness, readiness, and capabilities.
Indeed, today’s symposium occurs at a particularly fitting time, for this
is the final week of National Cyber Security Awareness Month, the
overarching theme of which this year is “Achieving Cybersecurity
Together.” The focus for this week is “Digital Literacy and Education,” a
perfect topic to bring to this audience. In keeping with these themes, what
follows are several steps that can be taken in the coming months and years
to adequately prepare for what lies ahead in this vital and dynamic field.
2. SYMANTEC, 2012 NORTON CYBERCRIME REPORT 6 (2012), available at http://nowstatic.norton.com/now/en/pu/images/Promotions/2012/cybercrimeReport/2012_Norton_Cybercri
me_Report_Master_FINAL_050912.pdf.
3. VERIZON, 2012 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 42 (2012), available at
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report2012-ebk_en_xg.pdf
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* * *
It is an axiom of modern life to say that today’s technological landscape
is changing rapidly. These changes create significant challenges for
attorneys, educators, and clients. For example, legal practitioners and
clients must understand a range of evolving issues just to conduct day-today business—e-filing, e-discovery, and preserving privilege in the digital
age are issues that are new in the last twenty years. Although the need for
every law student to demonstrate expertise in both law and technology with
respect to cyber issues may not yet be essential, it is approaching that point
for attorneys who want to practice in government cybersecurity fields. At
DHS, the goal is for attorneys to demonstrate not only expert legal skills,
but also technological literacy and a desire to develop expertise in the
operational fields they serve, to enable them to evaluate and make more
sophisticated legal and policy recommendations. Government, private
sector, and academic communities should understand that we share a range
of interests in promoting the sound practice of law in support of national
cybersecurity programs. And given the evolving nature of our highly
networked, digital world, we should take time to jointly and collaboratively
anticipate what the future holds so we can plan for our needs accordingly.
Over a century ago, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis took such an
approach in their seminal article, “The Right to Privacy,” arguing that
advances in technology and changes in business practices necessitated a
common law right to privacy. Citing the indecency and impropriety of the
press and the trade in gossip they said:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and
man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive
to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to
the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through
invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.4

It is no less true today than in 1890 that “modern enterprise and
invention”5 can create a range of personal harms that should have remedies
under the law if it is to provide a path to justice and a basis for a stable,
prosperous, and peaceful society. Unlike the rate of change of technology,
4. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196 (1890).
5. Id. at 196.
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which can be exponential, changes in the law tend to be reactive,
incremental, and almost always lagging.6 What we—government and legal
communities—should learn from Warren and Brandeis is their critical
assessment of the state of the law and society, their creativity in proposing
a solution to serve the law and society, and their courage to promote new
ideas. Although we are still in the relatively early days of the virtual world,
our society is already profoundly dependent on the cyber realm, so much so
that we must thoughtfully examine government roles in securing and
developing that realm as a function of a sovereign’s duties.
This symposium presents a good opportunity to highlight two main
drivers for a strong government role in cybersecurity. And borrowing a
term from the research and development community, we propose that
government must seek “leap ahead” approaches to privacy in these
endeavors to preserve the essence of individual liberty.
** *
Our first observation is that government necessarily has a role to play in
cybersecurity, if only because governments must now be prepared to
perform nearly all of their functions in cyberspace. For the Internal
Revenue Service, for example, this means providing tax information and
services online. For the Defense Department, this means not only
maintaining their cyber networks as a function of force readiness, but also
planning for the possibility that cyber networks and their supporting
infrastructure will be used as part of military action. For DHS, this means
understanding and addressing the cyber dimensions of the Department’s
five missions: preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and
managing our borders, enforcing and administering our immigration laws,
ensuring resilience to disasters, and, of course, safeguarding and securing
cyberspace.
To achieve these missions, DHS must know and understand how
terrorists, smugglers, traffickers, intellectual property thieves, and other
cybercriminals use cyberspace to cause harm or engage in wrongdoing.
And the Department must harness the capabilities and opportunities of
cyberspace to communicate with and serve those affected by disasters.
DHS does not, of course, and cannot do these things alone. It can achieve
its missions only in collaboration with the homeland security enterprise—
that is, together with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments;
with the academic community; with international entities; and with the

6. See generally Ivan K. Fong, Law and New Technology: The Virtues of Muddling
Through, 19 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 443, 454–61 (2001) (book review).
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private sector.
These relationships are particularly vital to the
Department’s efforts to secure critical infrastructure and information
systems. Indeed, DHS is uniquely positioned to work across the homeland
security enterprise to analyze and mitigate cyberthreats and vulnerabilities;
distribute threat warnings; provide solutions to key research and
development needs; and coordinate the vulnerability, mitigation, and
consequence-management response to cyber incidents. As a result of these
efforts, DHS has become the federal government’s focal point for ensuring
that our computers, networks, and information systems are and remain safe
for commerce, for communication, and for our national security.
In carrying out these core responsibilities, it is worth noting that DHS
puts a special emphasis on protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties.
The Department, for example, conducts privacy impact
assessments of cybersecurity programs, trains employees on privacy and
civil liberties, and consults privacy experts as cyber programs are
developed. Among these experts is the DHS chief privacy officer, who has
independent audit authority for DHS programs and works closely with
DHS officials to develop sound programs. Congress should rightly be
credited for this leap-ahead approach to privacy, because the position was
the first of its kind established by statute in the executive branch.7
DHS also aspires to a leap-ahead approach to privacy through
professional development programs. DHS administers the National
Initiative for Cybersecurity Education, through which the federal
government strives to attract, train, and retain a skilled cyber workforce.
This training and development effort is increasingly important, particularly
given that the size of the Department’s cybersecurity workforce increased
seven-fold during the last three years. And just two weeks ago, the
Department began to implement a slate of eleven recommendations from
its Homeland Security Advisory Council that are aimed at further
improving the Department’s cyber skills and relationships with academic
and professional communities. This comprehensive approach to workforce
development can deliver a leap-ahead approach to privacy in cybersecurity
by including a best-in-class program to instill privacy principles in all of
our cyber professionals. It is as true for privacy as for security that it is
better to build it in than to bolt it on.
DHS also uses technology to take a leap-ahead approach to privacy. The
Analytic Framework for Intelligence, or AFI, is a new and very important
7. State of Federal Privacy and Data Security Law: Lagging Behind the Times?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, Subcomm. on
Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt., 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (testimony of Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief
Privacy Officer, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76066/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76066.pdf.
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border security system that conducts federated query searches across the
Department’s multiple information systems to identify people and cargo at
border crossings or ports that pose security risks to the nation, while
eliminating the need to focus on those that pose no danger. Logical access
controls limit an analyst’s access to data linked to his or her authorized job.
And records are retrieved directly from a source system, precluding the
need for multiple copies of databases. These are not only good privacy
practices, but good security practices, because they help us produce more
accurate intelligence products quickly. As with the Department’s approach
to employee development, AFI shows how to achieve greater privacy by
design.
** *
Our second observation is that government entities have a responsibility
to be alert to and address a range of macroscopic forces shaping the nation
and the cyber environment. Trends in the economy, technological
developments, and security capabilities all factor into the issue of whether
the government should intervene, and if so, how to do so in an effective
and efficient way. The current and evolving cyberthreat landscape suggests
that reliance on the market alone to meet cybersecurity and privacy needs
has not and will not be sufficient to achieve the goal of a secure and
privacy-protective cyber environment.8 Any argument that the collective
responsibility of the market obviates the need for government guidance is
belied by recent events. One reason is that cybersecurity is not yet
scalable—that is, in many industries, for companies that provide critical
services, the cost of implementing government- and industry-recommended
best practices, such as the upgrading of cybersecurity systems, still
outweighs any perceived risk-reduction benefits.
In addition, cyberthreats impose externalities. That is, they impose risks
and harms beyond the individual entities that are directly affected.
Malware on one company’s network, for example, can cascade to the entire
sector or the economy at large. Given the significant public and private
interests at stake, the public and private sectors must therefore work

8. See generally, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, SECURING CYBERSPACE
FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY: A REPORT OF THE CSIS COMMISSION ON CYBERSECURITY FOR
THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 49–59 (2008), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/
081208_securingcyberspace_44.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW:
ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE
(2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/
Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY
SECURE CYBERSPACE (2003), available at http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/cyber
space_strategy.pdf.

TO
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together to develop industry-led, minimum baseline cybersecurity
standards. As John Brennan, the President’s homeland security and
counterterrorism advisor, has noted:
For decades, industry and government have worked together to protect
the physical security of critical assets that reside in private hands, from
airports and seaports to national broadcast systems and nuclear power
plants. There is no reason we cannot also cooperate to protect the cyber
systems of critical infrastructure on which our economic well-being,
national security, and daily lives depend.9

The law itself—including statutes, regulations, and court decisions—
serves as another macroscopic force in this area. Under current law,
Congress gave DHS significant cyber authorities, and DHS inherited a
patchwork of others. Although the law often changes subtly over time
through regulatory programs or application of the common law, it can also
change more significantly, when necessary, to address critical needs
through legislation. Over the past several years, successive administrations
have reported to the public and Congress that the current legal framework
for the nation to advance necessary cybersecurity programs is significantly
strained and increasingly outdated. Statutes applicable in this field include
the Communications Act,10 which dates to the era of Warren and Brandeis;
the National Security Act of 1947;11 the Privacy Act;12 and more recent
statues like the Federal Information Security Management Act,13 the
Homeland Security Act,14 and the Cyber Security Enhancement Act,15 all
of 2002. Each of these emerged from discrete sets of interests in
regulatory, military, information security, law enforcement, or
counterterrorism siloes that do not adequately address the cross-cutting
nature of the issues or the nation’s current, urgent cybersecurity needs.
In short, we have reached a point where current threats and the need for
strategic approaches to the nation’s cyber interests render our existing
amalgam of laws inadequate. The Administration’s recent cybersecurity
legislative proposal offered a detailed roadmap for Congress to begin to

9. Letter from John Brennan, Asst. to the President for Homeland Sec. and
Counterterrorism, to Chairman Jay Rockefeller, Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp.
(Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve
&File_id=f4da0411-6fb3-4f2b-b3d5-0fd6767ec8db.
10. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), amended by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
11. Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947).
12. Pub. L. No. 93–579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).
13. Pub. L. No. 107–347, Title III, 116 Stat. 2899, 2946 (2002).
14. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
15. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225, 116 Stat. 2135, 2156 (2002).
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take a more comprehensive approach to these issues. It would have
provided for the establishment of baseline cybersecurity practices for the
nation’s critical core infrastructure. Unfortunately, Congress’s inability to
act decisively and with foresight in this area may prove to be the most
significant government obstacle to improving the state of the nation’s
cybersecurity.
** *
As the Administration looks for additional opportunities to advance a
legislative solution in this important area, it obviously also keeps a
watchful eye on trends emerging in case law that affect its ability to
achieve its missions. Cases related to border security counterterrorism
programs, for example, and the use of electronic devices for administrative
and law enforcement purposes, guide government officials both in using
cyber capabilities to perform government functions and preserving our
interests in privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
The Supreme Court’s decision earlier this year in United States v.
Jones16 stands as a prime example. In Jones, the Court held that the
government’s warrantless use of a global positioning device to track the
public movements of a criminal suspect, over a four-week period, was an
unconstitutional search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Although Justice Scalia’s majority opinion relied on a common law theory
of trespass to find a Fourth Amendment violation, Justice Sotomayor’s
concurring opinion serves as a harbinger of future privacy considerations in
this area. She noted that a physical intrusion is now unnecessary for many
forms of surveillance and that even cases involving short-term monitoring
will require particular attention with respect to application of the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard.17
As a result of new
technology, she noted, “people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”18
Do people reasonably expect that the government might, without a
warrant, track their movements in a manner that would allow their political
and religious beliefs and their personal behaviors to be ascertained? Does
the answer change if such collection is done in the virtual world of cyber
infrastructure rather than the physical world of Jeeps and public roads?
How long should law enforcement entities be permitted to retain and search
such data for law enforcement purposes? Can they share such data with
other government entities, or use such data when obtained by other
16.
17.
18.

132 S. Ct. 954 (2012).
Id. at 955–56.
Id. at 957.
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government entities for non-law enforcement purposes? There are no
bright-line answers to these questions. But these are the kinds of questions
the Supreme Court is asking and that those in law enforcement, in
government generally, and you in the academic community need to help
answer.
The Jones case illustrates the growing tension—indeed collision is not
too strong a word—between settled legal doctrines and advances in
technology.19 Just as Brandeis and Warren noted in 1890, “modern
enterprise and invention” can subject an individual to far greater “mental
pain and distress” than can be “inflicted by mere bodily injury.”20 In
particular, the line between what is public and what is private is no longer a
clear one. Rather, with modern technology, what used to be considered a
binary distinction under the law—in which what is not private is, by
definition, public—must now be reconsidered in light of how people today
actually share information about themselves.
Courts have long held that individuals have no expectation of privacy
over information voluntarily disclosed to third-parties.21 Under this thirdparty doctrine, details such as your location on public streets, which you
share with those who see you, and the websites you visit, which you share
with your Internet service provider, are by default public. That means that
you do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy over such information,
and accordingly law enforcement may be permitted to obtain that
information about you without a warrant. When people share information
today, however, they often contemplate sharing information only with
certain categories of people. They may use privacy control settings, for
example, that allow information to be disseminated more broadly to family
and close friends and less broadly to others, if at all. In these and other
similar situations, users do not intend for all information to be “public” in
the traditional sense. Instead, “controlled disclosure” is a more accurate
way to think about how people share information in cyberspace today, and
the law must therefore adapt to that reality.
To the extent the third-party doctrine rests on assumptions about how
information is shared today that are no longer valid, the doctrine of
practical obscurity likewise rests on increasingly tenuous assumptions.
Over twenty years ago, in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press,22 the Reporter’s Committee sought
19. See, e.g., Fong, supra note 6, at 456 (noting areas where “modern-day courts and
lawyers are similarly struggling to fit new technologies into existing legal conceptual rules
and categories”).
20. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 196.
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
22. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
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access under the Freedom of Information Act to an individual’s “rap sheet”
maintained by the FBI, arguing that it should be disclosed because, among
other reasons, it contained information publicly available at the relevant
courthouses.23 Ruling for the government, however, the Supreme Court
held that the rap sheet was properly withheld under an exception to the
Freedom of Information Act; even though some information it contained
might technically be considered public, there is a high privacy interest in
maintaining the practical obscurity of personal information in the rap
sheet.24
Technology has, of course, rendered this privacy-protective aspect of
practical obscurity increasingly tenuous. The ability to aggregate and
instantaneously search for previously obscure data erodes any assurance
that information available only to a select few will not now be subjected to
broad dissemination. A notable recent example is the Stop Trading on
Congressional Knowledge (“STOCK”) Act, signed into law in April of this
year.25 In addition to restricting Congress from engaging in certain
financial transactions, the new law also requires certain financial disclosure
statements submitted by senior federal officials to be posted online in a
searchable database for public viewing. Before the STOCK Act, these
financial disclosures were available in paper form upon request, making
them public in a technical sense. It would have been difficult and
impractical, however, to aggregate and disseminate broadly the sensitive
information they contained. In recognition of the new reality, a district
court recently delayed the implementation of the Internet posting
requirement of the STOCK Act and ordered further briefing on whether
this portion of the new law violates these officials’ privacy rights in a way
that the earlier filing requirement did not.26
Mindful of ways that traditional legal theories and standards are now
being applied to new technologies, we are all engaged in defining privacy
as a societal value and shaping the way that privacy serves as a touchstone
for the development and delivery of sound public programs. We should
proactively and responsibly raise questions about the application of such
legal principles to situations unimagined when those principles were first
articulated. And we should examine our own personal values and be
prepared to articulate them as part of the national dialogue.
** *

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 760.
Id. at 780.
Pub. L. No. 112–105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).
Senior Exec. Ass’n v. United States, 891 F.Supp.2d 745, 755–56 (D. Md. 2012).
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The current generation of law students in particular is uniquely placed to
help shape the future of cyber law. To prepare yourself for a future
working on cybersecurity legal issues, you must first understand the law as
it applies outside the cyber realm. As we survey new legal ground in
cyberspace, we are constantly drawing upon analogies from other areas—
privacy, search and seizure, intellectual property, and other areas. You
should also learn the value of working in teams, and how to work
constructively with others, for virtually everything lawyers do is through
collaboration with others. And you should model your scope of vision,
clarity of argument, and breadth of purpose on the likes of Warren and
Brandeis. If you endeavor to serve narrow scopes and interests, you may
benefit small pockets of the legal and cyber communities, but you will miss
the opportunity to address the broader challenges at stake in a highly
networked world.
We need the best and the brightest minds to handle the evolving nature
of the threats facing the country. Few professional callings are greater than
being a government lawyer, serving the public interest. Look to the
Department of Homeland Security and other agencies performing
cybersecurity functions to develop your professional skills. Honors
programs, internships, and externships in government will give you
unrivaled perspective in the cyber field as it develops. More important,
being a government lawyer allows you to be part of something bigger than
yourself—it is a true public service. It is an opportunity to protect and
advance the rule of law, which is vitally important in homeland security
and national security contexts. And you are likely to get responsibility,
challenges, and opportunities earlier in your career than in other
professional settings.
** *
In closing, keep in mind two points. First, changes in technology require
changes in the law and thus leadership from lawyers. In this area,
government lawyers must “leap ahead” with a keen understanding of what
the nation requires of its public institutions. They must then help lead their
agencies and other communities to the changes that are necessary.
Academic, private sector, and government communities share these
responsibilities and interests, so they should strive to remain aware of the
trends emerging in each. We need smart, creative lawyers who understand
how to accomplish our mission while protecting civil rights and civil
liberties, privacy, and the core values that define this country.
For example, when might a distributed denial of service attack constitute

TRANSCRIPT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1142

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/3/2013 10:54 AM

[Vol. 62:1131

an armed attack or conflict under the law of war?27 Under what conditions
would such an attack trigger a nation-state’s right of self-defense?28 And
what are the limits of such responses? To what extent may online content
be restricted if it offends or incites violence half-way around the world?
What are the limits of “hacktivism”?29 To what extent may the government
rely on its authorities at the border to prevent, limit, or control cyberthreats
originating outside the country?30 And what is the future of Internet
governance? Your critical assessment, creativity, and courage to tackle
these and other fundamental issues can make you, for these topics, the
Warren and Brandeis of the future.
Second, government employment in these areas is an important public
service. Our nation has come together to meet great challenges before.
During World War II, when our economy was mobilized for war, the
American people found a way to feed themselves by growing forty percent
of all the vegetables we needed in twenty million victory gardens. In the
early years of the Cold War, Americans knew where the closest fallout
shelter was, and we kept children indoors when polio outbreaks were the
biggest threat to public health. In those times, Americans understood what
was at stake; they understood that they had to contribute; and they knew
that their efforts would make a difference, in ways large and small. We are
likewise confronting new realities here, and we need new thinking and new
energy. The world is a different place that it was fifteen years ago, before
9/11, and even ten years ago, just after 9/11.
You can contribute to those aims by joining the Department and other
parts of the homeland security enterprise. Doing so is urgent; doing so is
worthwhile; and doing so will undoubtedly impact our nation’s economic
vitality and way of life for generations. Together, we can—and we must—
maintain a cyberspace that is safe and resilient and that remains a source of
tremendous opportunity and growth for years and years to come. It is
27. See, e.g., Remarks of Harold Koh, State Dep’t Legal Adviser, to the the U.S. Cyber
Command Inter-Agency Legal Conference, (September 18, 2012), available at
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/
?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=harold-koh-on-international-law
-in-cyberspace (asserting that “the jus in bello principle of distinction applies to computer
network attacks undertaken in the context of an armed conflict” and that “States should
undertake a legal review of weapons, including those that employ a cyber capability.”).
28. See, e.g., Remarks of Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Def., to the Business Executives for
National Security, (October 11, 2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136 (stating that “[i]f a crippling cyber attack were launched
against our nation . . . [a]nd if the Commander in Chief orders a response, the Defense
Department must be ready to obey that order and to act”).
29. See Melinda Haag, Prosecution of Internet Hacktivist Group “Anonymous,” U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefing_room/cc/mca_anonymous.html (last
visited June 15, 2013) (recounting several investigations and prosecutions involving
hacktivists).
30. See, e.g., U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2013).
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encouraging to see such enthusiasm for these issues in the academic and
professional communities; we must draw on your tremendous creativity,
energy, and optimism to do something unlike what the nation has ever done
before. These are complex and long-term challenges. That should not,
however, be a reason for despair. It should instead motivate us to work and
think and collaborate in new ways. As Albert Einstein once said, “It’s not
that I’m so smart. It’s just that I stay with problems longer.” That hints at
the determination we must bring to one of today’s hardest challenges.
Thank you again for this opportunity to contribute to your symposium.

